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Abstract
Previous research has indicated that an ex-ante pledge of honesty reduces the likelihood
that participants will lie during a lab experiment. We show that a bandwagon effect, occurring
when participants know that others are acting dishonestly, can erode the positive effects of
honesty oaths. Taxpayers do not make their reporting decisions in a vacuum. They have access to
information concerning how others in the community are behaving and develop perceptions
around this information. We add these realistic features to a tax evasion game involving an exante honesty oath. Results indicate that social context can reduce the positive effects of honesty
oaths on reporting behavior.

Introduction
Increasing tax compliance is a complex and often costly task. Policymakers must decide
how much they can trust self-reporters to report honestly and how much to spend in deterring
evasion. The problem is one of information asymmetry (Beck and Jung 1989). Policymakers do
not know a self-reporter’s preference for risk nor their likelihood of reporting dishonestly.
Furthermore, regulators tend towards risk aversion and therefore prefer programs that prevent
risk to those that involve trusting self-reporters (Alain et al. 2014). Policymakers, as a result,
most often opt to increase the amount of money spent on monitoring and punishing tax evasion
to increase tax compliance. These tactics can be successful but carry high costs and regulatory
burdens that slowdown self-reporting programs as well as other government processes (Gilligan
2018).
Researchers have become increasingly interested in ways to effect truthful self-reporting
that reduce costly overhead and regulatory burden. Lab experiments have turned towards
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behavioral-centered frameworks that test the efficacy of behavioral nudges, commitment devices,
and framing techniques in inducing ethical behavior. The use of honesty oaths is part of this shift
that explores ways to increase compliance without adding cost.
In lab experiments, honesty oaths have been shown to increase honest behavior in various
self-reporting experiments. Beck et al. (2018) studied oaths in the context of dice-rolling games.
Participants were asked to self-report each roll of a dice and could earn more money for
reporting higher rolls. The experiment showed that participants who took an oath of honesty
reported more truthfully compared to participants who took no oath. Peer et al. (2021) found that
oaths “considerably and consistently reduce dishonesty” during an experiment where participants
were asked to solve equations for an allotted time and report the number of equations they solved
correctly (761).
Other experiments have focused specifically on taxpayer behavior. Participants in these
experiments earn money through sorting numbers or completing other tasks and are then asked to
choose an amount of income to report subject to a tax. Research shows similar results compared
to self-reporting involving dice rolling or problem solving; participants who have taken an oath
of honesty before beginning an experiment are more likely to report truthfully (Peer and Feldman
2021). Oaths in the context of tax-reporting experiments have proven effective both for in-person
experiments and crowd-sourced experiments conducted online (Jacquemet et al. 2021).
Honesty Oaths were originally borrowed from social psychology which developed a
theory of commitment devices that bind “the individual to behavioral acts” (Kiesler 1971).
Jacquemet et al. (2013) argue that honesty oaths work to establish a participant’s behavior before
they are given a choice concerning how to behave. Later work, however, shows that not
everyone is affected by commitment devices. Jacquemet et al. (2019) find that it is difficult to
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alter the behavior of chronic liars with honesty oaths, but partial liars can be transformed to full
compliers. Their results indicate that honesty oaths may have limitations not previously
identified. Additional limitations may exist concerning who can be affected and in what context.
The prevalent question concerning commitment devices and honesty oaths is whether
they can decrease cost and ease regulatory burden while ensuring truthful self-reporting (Peer
and Feldman 2021). Put differently, can policymakers, and others who rely on information selfreporters provide, trust a tactic as simple as an oath to deter behavior? While previous research
has indicated an affirmative response to these questions, further work is required to test the
validity of honesty oaths in environments that mirror the incentives of real-life taxpayers.
Specifically, the current literature is problematic in that no studies have been conducted focusing
on the effects of social information in addition to honesty oaths on self-reporting.
Beck and Jung (1989) were the first to argue that social information could be a motivator
in tax evasion. They found that people perceive tax evasion as being less unethical if evasion is
widespread. Recent research shows that knowledge of widespread tax evasion can induce an
individual to act dishonestly, creating a bandwagon effect in addition to altering their perception
about the ethics of evasion (Traxler 2010). In contrast to experiments conducted so far, taxpayers
and other self-reporters in real life have knowledge concerning how honestly others in their
community behave. Our research question is whether this social information can influence
reporting behavior even after participants have taken an honesty oath. We attempt to replicate
realistic taxpayer behavior by giving participants information on the level of honesty in the
community. We predict that truthful self-reporting decreases with the level of dishonesty in the
community, even after participants have taken a pledge of honesty. Ultimately, the experimental
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design tests for a bandwagon effect that could erode otherwise beneficial effects of honesty
oaths.

Experimental Design
Data was generated using Prolific, an online platform that gives participants the
opportunity to be paid for completing surveys and clinical experiments. The study was
distributed to a standard sample of participants living in the United States and available on
Prolific. Participants ranged in age from 18-79 with an average age of 35. They received $3 as
base pay for completing a post-study questionnaire in addition to a bonus. The bonus was earned
during the study and varied according to performance. A total of three treatments were
conducted. 50 people participated in treatment one, 100 people participated in treatment two, and
101 people in treatment three. In total, 251 people participated, and no subject participated in
more than one treatment. Each treatment had a run time of roughly 30 minutes, but many
participants finished within 15 to 20 minutes.
Participants in treatment one indicated their interest in the study by clicking an ad posted
on Prolific that included information concerning time required and expected pay for
participation. Once a participant agreed to the consent form and read the instructions, they were
asked to take a pledge of honesty. The wording of the pledge was taken from Beck (2021). The
pledge read: “Hereby I do swear that my actions during this experiment will be due to the
principle of honesty. In particular, I swear not to lie in order to enrich myself” (10).
Once a participant agreed to the pledge, they would begin the main task of the
experiment. Participants were presented with a 5x5 table of 25 numbers. Each number was
randomly populated and could be either 0 or 1. Participants were asked to count the number of
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1’s within the table and submit their count for evaluation. After each submission, a new table
would generate. Participants earned 9 cents for each correct entry and were not penalized for
incorrect entries. At the top of each participant’s screen was a timeclock showing the amount of
time remaining. They were also shown their total earnings which would update after each entry.

Figure 1: Screenshot of Main Task

After completing the task, participants were told how much money they earned in total
and tasked with deciding how much to report as income subject to a 40% tax. The instructions
for the study explained that money collected as tax would be donated to The American National
Red Cross. Before reporting, participants were given the opportunity to see how much they
would pay in taxes for different amounts of income reported. A graph and slider could be used to
explore these options. For example, taking the slider all the way to the right would show a
participant how much tax they would pay if they reported their full earnings. Once ready,
participants would enter their desired amount to report. They would then begin the post-study
questionnaire and be directed back to Prolific with a completion code.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of Reporting Page

Treatments two and three were identical to treatment one, but participants were given
additional information before reporting their earnings. They were told the average percentage of
income reported by participants in previous iterations of the study. A subset of data from
treatment one was used to calculate the average percentages reported to participants in treatments
two and three. Data in treatment one between the 25th and 50th percentiles were split at the
median to produce two groups. The average of the higher-compliant group (88%) was reported
to participants in treatment two. The average of the lower-compliant group (32%) was reported
to participants in treatment three. Participants were shown a screen explaining that, “on average,
participants in a previous iteration of this study chose to report (88 or 32) % of their income.”
This information was given to participants right before they made their reporting decision.
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Results
We computed the percentage of income reported for participants in all three treatments.
Participants reported an average of 67% in treatment one, 78% in treatment two, and 60% in
treatment three. Table 1 shows these percentages as well as the 25th and 75th percentile for each
treatment. We identify three types of participants: fully compliant participants who report their
full incomes, partial liars, and full liars who report no income. All three types were found in each
treatment. Treatment three, however, had the highest number of partial and full liars.

Table 1: Summary Table

Because each treatment displayed asymmetric distribution, a Kruskal-Wallis test was
used as a non-parametric test to check for differences between the three treatments. A post hoc
analysis was performed using Mann-Whitney U, or Wilcoxon Rank-Sum, tests to evaluate
pairwise differences. The Kruskal-Wallis test was statistically significant at the 5% level
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(p=.016), and we subsequently rejected the null hypothesis that the mean ranks of the treatments
were the same. A two tailed Mann-Whitney U test between treatments two and three indicated
that the null hypothesis that participants in both treatments came from the same distribution
should be rejected (p=.004). We also performed a one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test and rejected
the null hypothesis that the rank sum of treatment three was larger than the rank sum of treatment
two (p=.002).
Mann-Whitney U tests comparing treatments two and three to the baseline treatment were
not statistically significant. A power analysis indicated that a larger sample size for treatment one
would be required for valid Mann-Whitney U tests involving treatment one. The power analysis
did indicate that the Mann-Whitney tests between treatments two and three were valid. Results
showed that treatments two and three were significantly different from each other, and changes
in behavior occurred in the direction previously hypothesized.
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Figure 3: Bean-plots for Percent of Income Reported: All Treatments Included

We conclude that social context can drive differences in self-reporting behavior even
after participants commit to honesty by taking an ex-ante pledge. A bandwagon effect can occur
as an individual’s self-reporting behavior is affected by perceptions of how honest other
community members are. Results from this paper indicate that social context should be
considered when making conclusions about the efficacy of commitment devices like honesty
oaths. Future researchers should consider the sensitive nature of behavior and the effects that
social information can have on reporting decisions and choices concerning honesty more
broadly. Furthermore, researchers eager to use experimental findings to inform public policy
should be cautious of honesty oaths as a surefire route to tax compliance.
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